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A SILENT EMERGENCY PERSISTS:
THE LIMITED EFFICACY OF U.S. INVESTMENT
SANCTIONS ON BURMA
Anna E. Johansson
Abstract: For the past three decades, the repressive military junta that has ruled
Burma has engaged in torture, extra-judicial killings, compulsory labor, and arbitrary
arrests and detentions. Economic growth and human development in Burma have
stagnated. In response to human rights abuses and uninhibited drug production and
trafficking, the United States imposed investment sanctions on Burma in 1997. However,
Burma's regional alliances and illicit profits from drugs have filled any vacuum left by
withdrawal of U.S. investments and have neutralized the effect of the sanctions.
Therefore, the United States needs to rethink its current sanctions scheme. The United
States should consider a policy of constructive engagement to promote change,
sustainable self-help, and growth in Burma. Further, the United States should promote
international diplomatic involvement and should also support the establishment of a
national human rights commission in Burma. Alternatively, if the United States believes
that sanctions are the best method of promoting positive change in Burma, it should work
with a multilateral organization such as the World Trade Organization or the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations on a multilateral sanctions scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Burmese junta's human rights abuses have earned it the
distinction as one of the most repressive regimes in the world.' The rule of
the junta, known as the State Peace and Development Council ("SPDC"),
2
has led to widespread poverty, human suffering, and political unrest in
Burma.3  Burma's centralized and isolated economy, an oppressive
bureaucracy, and the uninhibited internal flow of drug-laundered money,
have subverted the lives of the Burmese people and discouraged foreign
1 Adrian Karatnycky, Introduction to The Most Repressive Regimes of 1998 (Apr. 1999) (A Special
Report to the 55th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, 1999)
<http://freedomhouse.org/reports/worst98/intro.html> [hereinafter Freedom House Introduction].
2 Formerly known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council ("SLORC"), the military regime
named itself the State Peace and Development Council in 1997 in an effort to improve its international
image. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, Burma Country Report on Human Rights Practices
for 1998, available in U.S. Department of State Homepage (visited Feb. 26, 1999)
<http://www.state.gov/www/globa/human-rights/1998_hrpjeport/burma.html> [hereinafter 1998 Burma
Human Rights Practices]. Fourteen older and lower-ranked generals also retired. Freedom House, Burma,
in Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1998-1999, reprinted in
The Most Repressive Regimes of 1998, supra note 1 [hereinafter Freedom House 1998 Ratings]. Despite
this shake-up and several investigations into corrupt ministries that resulted in the removal of several
ministers, the corrupt bureaucracy of the SPDC remains intact. Id.
3 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2.
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investment. In 1997, in response to human rights abuses and the junta's
inadequate suppression of the prospering narcotics trade, the United States
imposed sanctions on Burma.
5
Humanitarian intervention in the form of trade and economic
sanctions has become a favorite foreign policy tool of U.S. lawmakers in the
post Cold-war era.6 Seventy-five countries are now subject to some type of
U.S. economic or trade sanction. The United States imposes sanctions to
punish human rights violations, to discourage the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and to combat terrorism and drug trafficking. Sanctions
can include arms embargoes, foreign aid reductions and cutoffs, export and
import limitations, the revocation of most favored nation trade status, the
withdrawal of diplomatic relations, and prohibitions on financing and
investment.9 In the case of Burma, the United States imposed sanctions that
prohibit U.S. persons from making new investments in Burma.'
0
This Comment examines the current U.S. sanctions on Burma and
why these sanctions have been ineffective. Although the current sanctions
scheme is morally a sound policy, both internal and external factors have
reduced the efficacy of the sanctions. The prevalence of drug-laundered
funds within the Burmese economy, the minimal U.S. investment in Burma
before the imposition of sanctions, and the engagement policy of the
member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN")
have minimized the effect of the sanctions." Part II provides background onBurma and the problems that led to the imposition of U.S. sanctions. Part III
4 See Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2; James Finch, US. Sanctions Against Myanmar:
Are There Viable Alternatives?, 19 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 9 (1997); John Paul Rollert, A Drug Induced
High: The Price of Burma's Development, available in Burma Fund Homepage (visited Nov. 12, 1999)
<http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/-hpr/articles/cover4.html>; Dennis Bernstein & Leslie Kean, Singapore's
Blood Money: Hanging Drug Couriers but Investing with Their Suppliers; Singapore Is the Number One
Business Partner with Burma's Drug Dictatorship, NATION, Oct. 20, 1997, at 11.
' See infra Part III.
6 Panel I of Senate Task Force on Economic Sanctions Forum: Impact and Effectiveness of
Economic Sanctions: Capitol Hill Hearing with Defense Department Personnel, 104th Cong. (1998),
available in LEXIS, Legis/Hearng Database [hereinafter Task Force on Economic Sanctions]; see generally
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (Richard N. Haass ed., 1998).
7 Task Force on Economic Sanctions, supra note 6.
8 Id.
" Richard N. Haass, Introduction to ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note
6, at 1-2.
'0 See infra Part III. A bloody military crackdown following massive pro-democracy demonstrations
in 1988 inspired the regime to rename the country Myanmar and to change the name of the capital from
Rangoon to Yangon. Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: 'Promises to Keep
and Miles to Go Before I Sleep,' 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 1 n.5 (1999). The country is addressed
as Myanmar in the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Id. However this
Comment uses "Burma."
" See generally Finch, supra note 4; Rollert, supra note 4.
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describes the scope of the U.S. sanctions. Part IV examines the factors that
have limited the effect of the U.S. sanctions and allowed the junta to
maintain its grip on Burma.' 2  Part V argues that to ensure humanitarian
progress, the United States must rethink its current sanctions strategy. First,
the United States should consider a return to constructive engagement.
Second, the United States should encourage international diplomatic
involvement in Burma and encourage dialogue between the military junta,
the leading political opposition, the National League for Democracy
("NLD"), and ethnic minority groups, whose fight for greater autonomy
from the central government continues. Third, the United States should
promote the establishment of a national human rights commission in Burma.
Alternatively, if the United States chooses to maintain sanctions, it should
promote a sanctions scheme through a multilateral organization such as the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") or ASEAN.
II. BACKGROUND
Burma has an ethnically and religiously diverse population and is
endowed with abundant natural resources and ample potential for economic
growth. 13  However, the country has been under continuous authoritarian
rule since 1962 and is plagued by corrupt leaders whose abuse of power has
led to political repression and economic stagnation.' 4 Burma's economy has
performed poorly under the current regime and the junta's human rights
violations have earned it pariah status.' 5 Further, the junta's reliance on the
profits generated by the country's prosperous drug trade threatens social
progress and the development and sustainability of a healthy economy.16
A. Introduction to Burma
In 1962, economic uncertainties and ethnic minority insurgences led
to a military coup in Burma, after which the military replaced all democratic
12 See generally Land of Contradictions: Myanmar's Leaders View Their Country Very Differently
Than Outsiders, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., Feb. 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 13090101; Scott Neuman,
Burma Criticizes U.N. Report, available in Free Burma Coalition Homepage: News (Nov. 12, 1999)
<http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/1999/juntacriticizesunreport.html>.
13 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1999: Burma (visited Oct. 11, 1999)
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publicatoins/factbook/bm.html> [hereinafter World Factbook].
14 Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2.
15 See Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International Report 1999: Myanmar (visited Oct. 11, 1999)
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/asa16.htm> [hereinafter Amnesty Int'l 1999 Report];
Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2.
16 See infra Part II.C.
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institutions with a military government and isolated Burma from the
international community. 17 This self-imposed isolation and the formation of
a centrally planned economy under the slogan of "the Burmese way to
socialism" led to Burma's economic decline.' 8 Attempts at economic reform
in the seventies failed due to macroeconomic and structural factors. 19 Rich
in natural resources, Burma was a leading rice exporter prior to 1962, and
trade accounted for nearly forty percent of its gross domestic product
("GDP").20 Between 1970 and 1977, this figure decreased to thirteen
percent and the country became dependent on food aid.2'
Burma's economic stagnation led to massive student and clergy-led
22
pro-democracy movements in the seventies and eighties.23 In September
1988, the military responded to a massive pro-democracy uprising with fatal
brutality and installed a hard-line military regime, the State Law and Order
Restoration Council ("SLORC").2 a About three thousand students were
massacred when the military occupied Rangoon University in the
crackdown.25
17 Lucien J. Dhooge, A Close Shave in Burma: Unocal Corporation and Private Enterprise Liability
for International Human Rights Violations, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 11-12 (1998).
18 World Bank, Myanmar-Policies for Sustaining Economic Reform (Oct. 16, 1995)
<http://www.worldbank.org/pics/eco/14062> [hereinafter 1995 World Bank Report]. In 1988 there were
only four private firms with more than 100 employees compared to 426 state-owned enterprises of similar
size. Jalal Alamgir, Against the Current: The Survival of Authoritarianism in Burma, 70 PAC. AFF. 333,
340-42 (1997).
19 See Alamgir, supra note 18, at 341.
20 Id.
21 Id.
2 The Sangha, the Buddhist clergy, have played a central role in the pro-democracy movements. Id.
at 343. See also U.S Department of State, U.S. State Department 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in
Burma, available in The Burma Fund Homepage (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.burmafund.org/
Research_Library/Religious%20Freedom%20in%2OBurma.htm>. Additionally, in October 1999, the U.S.
State Department announced that Burma is one of seven countries (the others being China, Afghanistan,
Iran, Iraq, Serbia and the Sudan) designated for possible sanctions for engaging in or tolerating
"particularly severe" violations of religious freedom. US: 7 Nations Face Sanctions for Religious
Persecution, Dow Jones Int'l News Serv., Oct. 5, 1999, available in LEXIS, Djins.
23 See Alamgir, supra note 18, at 343; U.S. Department of State, Burma-Consular Information
Sheet (visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.travel.state.gov/burma.html> [hereinafter Consular Information
Sheet]L Alamgir, supra note 18, at 343; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text for an explanation of
the SLORC name-change to the SPDC in 1997.
25 Dhooge, supra note 17, at 12. Student uprisings in December 1996, and August and September of
1998 were similar to the 1988 uprising. ld; see also Consular Information Sheet, supra note 23. The junta
recently began reopening universities that had been open for only 30 months between 1988 and 1996. Mike
Jendrzejczyk, How Rangoon Could Get Burma Back into the Wide World, INT'L HERALD TuaB., available in
Burma Project Homepage (Jan. 6, 2000) <http://www.soros.org/bunna/ burmanetnews bnn010600.html>. In
October 1999, student dissidents seized diplomats and foreigners as hostages at the Burmese embassy in
Thailand. The students demanded the release of all political prisoners in Burma and renewed dialogue between
the military regime and the leading opposition political faction, the NLD. WRAP: Armed Men Take over
Myanmar's Embassy in Thailand, Dow Jones Int'l News Serv., Oct. 1, 1999, available in LEXIS, Djins.
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The junta believed that economic liberalization would quiet demands
for democracy and thus initiated market-oriented reform to encourage
foreign investment in the early nineties.26 A 1999 International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") report relying on data provided by the Burmese authorities
states that foreign direct investment increased from $135.2 million in
1994/1995 to $421.4 million in 1997/1998.27 However, excessive
government interference in the economy and persistent macroeconomic
imbalances continue to undermine both economic liberalization and attempts
to attract foreign investment. 28  In 1998, Burma experienced its fourth
consecutive year of declining growth.29  Total foreign direct investment
dropped to $278.2 million. 0  Additionally, in response to the 1988
crackdown, both the World Bank and the IMF stopped lending to Burma.
31
The Asian Development Bank, which also banned financial assistance in
1988, renewed its ban in 1997.32
In another attempt to quiet Burma's national unrest, the regime held
multiparty elections in May 1990. 33 While the leading opposition party, the
NLD, won an overwhelming victory with eighty percent of the vote, the
regime refused to honor the results.3 Furthermore, when the NLD convened
a parliament in 1998 based on the 1990 election results, the regime ended its
political dialogue with the NLD and detained 200 NLD members along with
hundreds of other pro-democracy supporters.3 Approximately 1,000
political prisoners remain incarcerated.36
The junta made further attempts in the nineties to solidify and
legitimize its rule. To legitimize its authoritarianism, the junta convened a
Consequently, the Thai government, which had previously been sympathetic and tolerant of exiled Burmese
students, resettled the students in countries outside of Thailand such as the United States, Canada, and
Australia. Anucha Charoenpo, Academics Tell Government to Inspire Change in Burma, BANGKOK POST, Oct.
8, 1999, at 3; Yuwadee Tunyasiri & Temsak Traisophon, Maneeloy Holding Centre: Majority Sign Up for
Resettlement: of 900 Applications, 567 Ask to Go to US., BANGKOK POST (Nov. 19, 1999), available in
Shwelnc NEWs <http://www.shweinc.com/news/data/9911119083807.shtml>.
26 See 137 CONG. REC. E40004-01, E4004 (1991); Int'l Monetary Fund, Myanmar: Recent Economic
Developments (Nov. 1999) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/1999/cr99134.pdt> [hereinafter 1999
IMF Report].
27 1999 IMF Report, supra note 26, at 78.
2" Id. at 8.
29 Id.
'o Id. at 76.
"' Dhooge, supra note 17, at 21.
32 Id.
33 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2.
3 The NLD won 392 out of the 485 parliamentary seats. Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2.
35 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2.
36 Id. Prison conditions are extreme and life threatening. Poor nutrition, inadequate medical care,
and the use of solitary confinement are common. Id.
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national convention to draft a new constitution in 1992 and 1993. 37 One of
the provisions approved at the convention guaranteed the military twenty-
five percent of the seats in any future parliament.38 Although Aung San Suu
Kyi, the NLD leader and 1991 Nobel laureate who was arrested after the
1988 uprising, was released from her six-year house arrest in 1995, the
regime continues to severely limit her actions.
39
Today, Burma's abundant natural resources and human potential are
juxtaposed against the poverty and underdevelopment that has resulted from
the military junta's repressive reign.40 While the literacy rate of eighty-three
percent exceeds that of most of its neighbors, only twenty-seven percent of
children complete a five-year primary school course of study in Burma, and
there is less than one doctor for every twelve thousand individuals. 41 In rural
areas, fifty percent of the population lacks access to safe drinking water.42
The 1998 estimate of the GDP real growth rate is one percent.43 The GDP is
estimated to be $14.2 billion, with a per capita income of about $300.44
Additionally, over forty percent of the annual budget goes to the military,
whereas less than five percent is allocated to education.45 The military
budget has grown from $100 million in 1988 to just under $1 billion in
1994.46 For 1994/1995, this placed Burma thirty-seventh in the world in
defense expenditures, whereas it ranked one hundred and thirtieth in human
development.47
B. Human Rights Violations
The Burmese junta's human rights abuses have come under close
scrutiny by the international community since the 1988 military
crackdown.48 For the purpose of this Comment, human rights are considered
37 In 1988 the SLORC annulled the 1974 constitution and declared martial law. See, e.g., Alamgir,
supra note 18, at 338.
3I Id. at 346.
3 MYANMAR: Review 1998, ASIA & PAC. REV. WORLD INFO., Nov. 1, 1998, at 2, available in 1998
WL 26760503 [hereinafter Myanmar 1998 Review]. On at least four occasions in 1998, the SPDC
prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from leaving Rangoon. 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2.
40 1999 IMF Report, supra note 26, at 6.
41 Dhooge, supra note 17, at 16-17.
42 id.
43 Myanmar 1998 Review, supra note 39.4 See U.S. & Foreign Commercial Serv. & U.S. Dep't of State, Country Commercial Guide:
Burma-Fiscal Year 1998 (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.fta.doc.gov/uscs/ccg98/ccgoburn.html>
[hereinafter Country Commercial Guide]; 1999 IMF Report, supra note 26, at 4.
45 Dhooge, supra note 17, at 16.
46 Alamgir, supra note 18, at 344.
47 Id.
48 1999 Amnesty Int 7 Report, supra note 15.
VOL. 9 No. 2
U.S. SANCTIONS ON BURMA
to be those basic rights enumerated in the first twenty articles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"). 4 9  These include the
right to life, liberty, and the security of one's person; the right to freedom
from slavery or servitude; the right to freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; the right to equality before the law; and
the right to own property. °
1. General Abuses
The past several years have seen an increase in the arbitrary beating
and killing of civilians, torture, and other cruel and inhuman treatment,
compulsory labor, forcible relocation, and a continued ban on freedom of
expression and assembly in Burma. 51 Freedom House, a human rights
watchdog, rated Burma as one of the "worst violators" of basic political
rights and civil liberties in their annual 1998/1999 survey. 52 Freedom House
has consistently given Burma low rankings for political rights and civil
liberties since it began monitoring basic human rights in 1972.51 Military
personnel in Burma arbitrarily search private homes, censor mail, and
monitor telephone conversations.54 In June 1996, James Nichols, honorary
consul for Norway, died in prison while serving a three-year sentence for the
"unauthorized use of a fax machine. 55 Internet access also remains highly
restricted.56
49 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doe. A/810 at 71 (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR]. Burma is an original signatory to the UDHR. Harvetta M. Asamoah et al.,
International Legal Developments in Review: 1998 Public International Law, 33 INT'L L. 555, 561 (1999).
50 UDHR, supra note 49, arts. 3-5, 7, 17.
st Amnesty nt 7 1999 Report, supra note 15; Myanmar 1998 Review, supra note 39; 1998 Burma
Human Rights Practices, supra note 2.
52 Burma was rated one of the most repressive regimes in the world along with Afghanistan, Cuba,
Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Vietnam,
Kosovo, and Tibet. Freedom House Introduction, supra note 1. The ratings are based on information from
published materials and human rights monitors, journalists, and representatives of both the private sector
and trade union movement. Freedom House, Methodology, in The Most Repressive Regimes of 1998, supra
note 1.
53 Freedom House, Country Ratings for All Years: Bolivia-Congo (visited Feb. 17, 2000)
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/table2.html>.
54 Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2.
35 Alamgir, supra note 18, at 345.
56 Consular Information Sheet, supra note 23.
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2. Forced Labor
The military regime in Burma engages in extensive use of forced
labor for army operations and public works projects." A U.S. Department
of Labor report states, "in recent years, the SLORC has increasingly
supplemented declining gross investment with uncompensated peoples
'contributions,' chiefly of forced labor, to build or maintain irrigation,
transportation and tourism infrastructure projects. 58 For example, Burmese
farmers from the southern Tenasserim region brought suit in John Doe I, et
al. v. Unocal Corp. et al. against the U.S. petroleum firm Unocal, which
partly financed the construction of the massive Yadana gas pipeline.5 9 The
suit alleged tortious conduct and violations of international human rights by
the SPDC, which used forced labor, violence, and intimidation to relocate
villages and steal property for the benefit of the pipeline construction.
Although Unocal continues to receive harsh criticism for its implicit support
of the regime's alleged human rights abuses during the pipeline construction,
its operations in Burma continue. 60 In July 1998, the International Labor
Organization, an organization that monitors workers' rights worldwide,
found that the Burmese military junta "widely and systematically" engages
in forced labor.6'
3. Environmental Abuses
While Burma is rich in natural resources such as petroleum, timber,
tin, zinc, natural gas, copper, lead, and coal, environmentalists argue that the
junta's exploitation of these resources is leading to ecological devastation. 62
In particular, the expansion of the gas industry poses a threat not only to the
57 Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2; 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2.
58 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, Burma Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1997, available in U.S. Dep't of State Homepage (Jan. 30, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/
www/global/human -rights/1I997_hrp_report/burma.html>.5 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 884 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (brought under the federal Alien
Tort Claims Act and holding that the Burmese plaintiffs have standing to sue Unocal for violations of
human rights); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (equitable relief that would
halt Unocal's participation in the Yadana gas pipeline denied). But see Barry Wain, A Pipeline Brings
Prosperity to Myanmar's Poor, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2000, available in 2000 WL-WSJA 2933936.
60 Unocal President John Imle has said, "Unocal is motivated by 'geology and geography-not
geopolitics.' Dhooge, supra note 17, at 7.
61 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2.
62 Stephanie Tai, Foreign Publication & Book Review, 11 GEO INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 497 (1999)
(reviewing ARTICLE 19: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE AGAINST CENSORSHIP, PARADISE LOST? THE
SUPPRESSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN BURMA (1994)); World
Factbook, supra note 13.
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environment but also to human development in Burma.63  For example,
observers allege that Burma's rain forest and endangered species were
harmed during construction of the Yadana gas pipeline64 in the southern
Tenasserim region of Burma.65
C. Drug Trafficking and the Oppression of Ethnic Minorities
Burma is the world's leading heroin producer. 66 The junta contributes
to Burma's prospering narcotics trade.67  In recent years, the regime has
negotiated numerous cease-fire agreements with warlords in the ethnic
minority areas who continue to fight for greater autonomy from the central
government and have increasingly turned to the profitable drug trade.68 In
exchange for their allegiance to the regime, the junta tolerates the warlords'
63 The Worldwide Fund for Nature considers Tenasserim one of 200 globally significant ecosystems
with one of the largest and most diverse mammal populations in Asia. Ellen Alcom, The Unlikely Activist,
CONDE NAST TRAVELER, Nov. 1999, at 56, 60.
6 Dhooge, supra note 17, at 3. When completed, the 416-mile pipeline will be the country's largest
source of revenue and foreign currency. The pipeline will earn between $200 and $500 billion annually
and provide 525 million cubic feet of natural gas. Id. at 2.
65 Alcom, supra note 63, at 59-60. The Burmese government and a multinational consortium of
energy companies, which include Unocal (American), TOTAL (French), Petroleum Authority of Thailand,
and Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise ("MOGE"), which is Burma's state-owned oil and gas-company,
financed the multi-billion dollar Yadana pipeline project. Thailand's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Sukhumbhand Paribatra, has remarked:
I regret very strongly that a company, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand, which is owned by
the government, was party of a deal which bought gas from Burma, and hence opened up the
conditions for the suppression of the Karens in the area where the gas pipelines have to pass. So
I think that, for better or worse, we have blood on our hands.
Id. at 64.
6 World Factbook, supra note 13. Burma produces approximately 24,000 metric tons of heroin per
year, which is far above the U.S. consumption of about 10 metric tons per year. Laying Blame, S. CHNA
MORNING POST, Feb. 24, 1999, at 14 [hereinafter Laying Blame]. The United States argues that Burma's
counter-narcotics efforts are insufficient. President's Letter to Congressional Leaders on Burma, 34 WKLY.
COMP. PRESIDENT DOCUMENT 967 (May 26, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 President's Letter]. See generally
Bureau of Int'l Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs, INL Country Programs Asia/Africa/Middle East
(visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics law/fs asafme.html>.
67 See generally PBS Frontline, Interview with Barry R. McCaffrey (visited Feb. 17, 2000)
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pagesfrontline/showsheroin/crackdown/mccaffrey/html> [hereinafter McCaffrey
Interview]; 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2; Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2;
Albright: Myanmar Human Rights Abuses Threaten Asia Security, Dow Jones Int'l News Serv., July 25, 1999,
available in LEXIS, Djins.
" Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2. Burma's ethnic minorities have been struggling for
greater autonomy from the central government since the late 1940s. Id. The Burmese are the nation's
dominant ethnic group and constitute about 68% of the population. David Schmahmann & James Finch,
The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with
Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 177 (1997). Other ethnic groups in Burma include
the Shan (9%), the Karen (7%), the Rakhine (4%), the Chinese (3%), the Mon (2%), and the Indian (2%).
World Factbook, supra note 13.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
69drug activities. Illicit drug exports have more than doubled since the
SLORC seized power in 1988.70 In fact, because the warlords reinvest a
significant portion of their drug profits in Burmese infrastructure, drug
trafficking has become the backbone of the Burmese economy.7 '
The military's human rights abuses are especially widespread in areas
72populated by ethnic minorities. Undercover agents report that numerous
villages in the northern Arakan Yoma mountain range have been expelled
from their land so that the land can be used for opium cultivation by the drug
lords.73 In the Shan state, where much of the poppy cultivation originates,
the military .has played a role in the relocation of more than 1,400 villages
and the uprooting of 300,000 people since 1996. 74 One human rights
organization, the Burma Fund, estimates that about 150,000 refugees remain
exiled from the country, and that an additional 350,000 refugees remain
within Burma.75
D. Consequences of the Junta's Oppressive Rule
The Burmese junta's human rights violations and repressive political
agenda have turned the resource-rich Southeast Asian nation into a
deteriorating zone of poverty, malnutrition, and warfare.76 With the junta's
backing, Burma has become the world's leading heroin exporter,77 and the
junta gladly accepts the reinvestment of these drug profits into the Burmese
infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Burmese economy continues to stagnate,
and attempts to liberalize the economy and promote foreign investment have
failed.78 Consequently, the junta resorts to both forced labor and forcible
relocation to support internal development projects.79
Further, because of the accessibility and quasi-legitimacy of heroin, 0
the HIV-infection rate in Burma is growing. Human rights investigator
69 Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2.
70 Bernstein & Kean, supra note 4.
7' Rollert, supra note 4.
72 Amnesty Int'l 1999 Report, supra note, 15.
73 Laying Blame, supra note 66, at 14.
74 Amnesty Int'l, Myanmar: Atrocities in the Shan State (visited Oct. 11, 1999)
<httpi/www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1998/ASA/31600598.hin>, offers an in-depth review of the political and
economical turmoil and human rights abuses in the central Shan State.
'5 Burma Fund, Burma Fund's Burma in Summary (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.
burmafund.org/ResearchLibrary/burma in summary.htm>.
76 See 1999 IMF Report, supra note 26.
7 World Factbook, supra note 13.
79 See 1999 IMF Report, supra note 26; Finch, supra note 4, at 14.
79 See supra Part II.B.2.
80 Rollert, supra note 4.
VOL. 9 No. 2
US. SANCTIONS ON BURMA
Benjamin Min, who was formerly with the SPDC Ministry of Mines,
reported that two-thirds of the 100,000 workers at the government-owned
Hpakant Jade Mine chose to receive their wages in the form of heroin.8
Hundreds of miners shoot up in on-site galleries with a single needle.
82
While the World Health Organization estimates approximately 500,000 of
Burma's forty-seven million people are HIV positive,83 the re4me
acknowledges only 21,503 confirmed HIV cases and 2,854 AIDS cases. In
April 1999, Dr. Peter Piot, executive director of the United Nations AIDS
program UNAIDS said, "Burma has the second worst AIDS epidemic in
Asia .... But the big problem is the recognition of the problem by the
government."
85
In response to the well-scrutinized human rights abuses and the
junta's insufficient anti-narcotics actions, Western countries have taken
retaliatory trade actions. 86  In October 1999, the European Union foreign
ministers extended European sanctions on Burma.87  European Union
sanctions include a visa ban on military officials, a withdrawal of
preferential tariff treatment for Burma,88 and an arms embargo, all of which
were extended in 1999.89 Canadian sanctions imposed since 1997 limit
exports to Burma and have removed Burma's eligibility under Canada's
General Preferential Tariff.9° As the only political, military, and economic
superpower, the United States has also taken an active approach to human
81 Id.
82 id.
83 Burma Fund, Remarks of Eric Schwartz at the Workshop on Humanitarian Aid to Burma (visited
Nov. 12, 1999) <htp://www.burmafund.org/Research_Library/Remarks%20of20Eric%2Schwartz. htm>;
see also Burma Fund, The Humanitarian Crisis, Aid and Governance in Burma: A Working Paper for the
Workshop on Humanitarian Aid to Burma (May 24, 1999) <http://www.burmafund.org/Research_Library/
Humanitarian%20Crisis%2OAid%20and%2OGovemance.htm> [hereinafter Humanitarian Aid Working
Paper. 1999 IMF Report, supra 26, at 5.
85 See Humanitarian Aid Working Paper, supra note 83.
6 In its 1990 human rights report on Burma, the U.S. State Department concluded that "torture,
beatings, and mistreatment of political detainees were commonplace." 137 CONG. REc. S3106-02 (1991).
EU Renews Myanmar Sanctions, Dow Jones Int'l News Serv., Oct. 11, 1999, available in LEXIS,
Djins [hereinafter EU Renews Myanmar Sanctions]; 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2.
88 The Generalized System of Preferences, which was revoked for Burma, is a system under
which preferential tariff treatment is granted on a non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory basis by most
developed countries to exports from developing countries. United Nations Conference on Trade &
Development, The Generalized System of Preferences and Other Trade Laws (visited Mar. 21, 2000)
<http://www.unctad.org/en/techcop/trad0103.htm>.
89 EU Renews Myanmar Sanctions, supra note 87.
90 Thio, supra note 10, at 44-45; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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rights compliance in Burma by imposing sanctions.91 In 1997, the United
States prohibited future investment in Burma by U.S. persons.92
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. SANCTIONS ON BURMA
The United States first took action in response to the repressive SPDC
regime in the late eighties, but waited another decade to impose additional
sanctions. To punish Burma for its human rights violations and insufficient
anti-narcotics actions, the United States imposed sanctions on Burma under
the Burma policy provision of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 1997 ("the Act").9 3 Along with imposing a visa ban and a prohibition
on all non-humanitarian aid, the Act authorized the President to prohibit all
new investment in Burma if the situation there did not improve. On May
20, 1997, the President issued Executive Order 13,047, which prohibits all
new investment in Burma by U.S. persons. 95
A. Chronology of Events Related to U.S. Sanctions on Burma
1. Initial Action
The United States took several actions to punish Burma prior to
imposing sanctions in 1997. In 1989, after the bloody suppression of pro-
democracy demonstrators and the subsequent house arrest of the NLD leader
Aung San Suu Kyi, the United States proclaimed that Burma's eligibility
under the U.S. Generalized Systems of Preferences would be suspended
until the Burmese junta afforded its labor force internationally recognized
labor rights.96 In an effort to target the Burmese garment industry, President
Bush, under the authority of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, did not
renew the Bilateral Textile Agreement with Burma, which lapsed on
December 31, 1990. 97 In 1990 textile imports accounted for $9.2 million of
the total $22 million in trade between the United States and Burma.98 The
United States did not impose further sanctions until 1997.
91 Task Force on Economic Sanctions, supra note 6.
92 See infra Part III for a description of current U.S. sanctions against Burma.
93 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 ("Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act")
§ 570, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-165 (1999).
9 Id. § 570(b).
95 Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28, 301 (May 20, 1997) [hereinafter Exec. Order No.
13,047].
96 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2; see supra note 88 and accompanying text.97 137 CONG. REC. S10487 (1991).
9' Id. at S10488.
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2. Section 570 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997
The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 prohibits all
aid to Burma except humanitarian assistance,99  counter-narcotics
assistance, °° and assistance to advance democracy and human rights.' 0' It
requires the United States to oppose multilateral loans, including World
Bank and IMF loans, 0 2 and prohibits the issuance of American visas to
Burmese officials.'0 3  The Act also encourages the President to develop a
multilateral strategy to foster democracy and humanitarian progress in
Burma.1 4 Finally, Section 570(b) of the Act authorizes the President to
prohibit new investment "if the Government of Burma has physically
harmed, rearrested for political acts, or exiled Aung Sun Suu Kyi, or has
committed large-scale repression of or violence against the democratic
opposition."
105
U.S. investment sanctions were imposed to limit the Burmese junta's
ability to build military muscle with profit generated from U.S. investors.
The junta's extensive controls over Burma's economy allow it to pocket
such profit and disperse it to the military. 0 6  Some senators, such as
Kentucky Republican Mitch McConnell and New York Democrat Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, favored complete divestiture from Burma. 10 7  However,
Congress did not want to harm existing U.S. business interests or eliminate
the entire U.S. presence in Burma due to concerns regarding future
99 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act § 570(a)(l)(A).
'00 Id. § 570(a)(l)(B).
'01 Id. § 570(a)(1)(C).
102 Id. § 570(a)(2).
103 Id. § 570(a)(3).
I4 Id. § 570(c).
105 See Exec. Order No. 13,407, supra note 95.
106 As Burton Levin, former U.S. Ambassador to Burma said, "whatever money SLORC obtains from
foreign investors it pours directly into the army, while the rest of the country is collapsing." Burma.net,
Burma's Purchasing Laws: Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec. 9, 1999) <http://www.burma.net/
selective-purchasing/bsp_faq.html#sanctions>.
107 See id. at 331 (citing congressional debate from 142 CONG. REC. 58749 (daily ed. of July 25,
1996), which contains a statement by Senator Johnson, who opposed a total ban on economic activity:
No one defends the SLORC, the group that is running Myanmar, or Burma... The question is:
would it be effective to do what Senator McConnell has proposed? ... [W]ould it help achieve
the end? Mr. President, I think it would do precisely the opposite. Mr. President, to cut off
American participation in Burma-not foreign participation but American participation-
would be exactly the wrong thing. First of all, it is no sanction because Americans are less than
ten percent of foreign investment in Burma today ... and the question is: Is it good to have an
American company, or would it be better to have Total, the French company, have the contract?
Really that is the question proposed by the McConnell approach. I submit that it is better to
have an American company there.)
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economic ties with Burma. 08 In the end, the Senate compromised with
Section 570(b), which was known as the so-called Cohen-Feinstein
Amendment. As such, sanctions cover only future investments and do not
mandate a complete withdrawal of all U.S. interests in Burma. 09
3. Executive Order No. 13,047
On May 20 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order No.
13,047 (the "Order"), which prohibits new investment or the facilitation of
new investment in Burma by U.S. persons." 0  The Order was issued under
the authority of Section 570(b) of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 1997,"' and Section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act ("IEEPA").I" 2 President Clinton declared a national emergency
under the IEEPA so that criminal sanctions could be invoked if the Order
were violated." 3 Violations of the Order may prompt criminal penalties of
up to ten years in jail, $500,000 in corporate and $250,000 in individual
fines, along with a civil penalty of $11,000.11 4  Under the IEEPA the
President must also report to Congress every six months on the status of the
situation in Burma."15
The Order prohibits new investment and the facilitation of such
investment by a U.S. person in Burma after May 21, 1997.116 The entry into,
performance, or financing of a contract to sell or purchase goods, services,
or technology, non-equity investments, and non-profit activities and
programs are exempt from the prohibition." 7  Additionally, current U.S.
log See James Finch et al., With a Broad Brush: The Federal Regulation of Sanctions Against Burma
(Myanmar), 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 324, 337 (1999).
109 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act § 570(b).
110 Exec. Order No. 13,407, supra note 95.
' See supra Part III.A.2.
112 Exec. Order No. 13,047, supra note 95.
113 Although the President did not explain how the situation in Burma poses "an extraordinary and
unusual threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States," he stated in his letter to
Congress that "[i]t is in the national security and foreign policy interests of the U.S. to seek an end to
abuses of human rights in Burma, to support efforts to achieve democratic reform that would promote
regional peace and stability, and to urge effective counter-narcotics policies." Exec. Order No. 13,047,
supra note 95. Yet it is difficult to argue that Burma is a threat to the security and stability of the region.
Burma has existed in virtual isolation from the international community since the early sixties and has
maintained good relations with neighboring countries. Finch et al., supra note 108, at 326.
114 Exec. Order No. 13,047, supra note 95; 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (1999). Office of Foreign Assets
Control, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, An Overview of the Burmese Sanctions Regulations (visited Nov. 9,
1999) <http://www.treas.gov/ofac> [hereinafter BSR]. Executive Order 13,047 is still in force.
Continuation of Emergency with Respect to Burma, 3 C.F.R. Note of 5/18/99.
115 50 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (1999).
..6 Exec. Order No. 13,047, supra note 95.
"7 See infra Part III.B.4.
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investors may, under license approved by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control ("OFAC") of the U.S. Department of Treasury, make subsequent
related investments to projects initiated before May 21, 1997.1 8 On May 21
1998, OFAC issued Burmese Sanctions Regulations to implement the
prohibitions of the Order.l" 9
B. Description of Sanctions
1. Prohibition on New Investment
Under the sanctions scheme, future investment in the economic
development of resources in Burma by U.S. persons on or after May 21,
1997 is prohibited. 20  U.S. persons are defined as "U.S. citizens and
permanent resident aliens wherever they are located, entities organized
under U.S. law (including their foreign branches), and entities and
individuals actually located in the U.S. ''121 New investment is defined as (1)
a contract with the "Government of Burma"'122 or a "nongovernmental
entity" 23 in Burma for the economic development of resources located in
Burma; (2) the entry into a contract providing for the general supervision
and guarantee of another person's performance of a contract that includes
the economic development of resources located in Burma; and (3) the
purchase of a share of ownership in the economic development of resources
in Burma. 124 Investments not prohibited include not-for-profit, educational,
health, or other humanitarian investments or activities.
25
115 See infra Part III.B.2; Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 537.407 (1999).
"1 BSR, supra note 114.
120 Exec. Order No. 13,047, supra note 95; 31 C.F.R. § 537.201.
121 BSR, supra note 114; 1998 President's Letter, supra note 66.
122 The "Government of Burma" includes "any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof." 31 C.F.R. § 537.306.
123 "Non-governmental entity" includes "partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or
other organization ... that is located in Burma or exists for the exclusive or predominant purpose of
engaging in the economic development of resources in Burma or derives its income predominantly from
such economic development." Id. § 537.309.
124 BSR, supra note 114. The regulations contain a definition of"new investment":
The term new investment means any of the following activities, if such an activity is undertaken
pursuant to an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such an agreement, that is
entered into with the Government of Burma or a nongovernmental entity in Burma on or after
the effective date: (a) [t]he entry into a contract that includes the economic development of
resources located in Burma; (b) [t]he entry into a contract providing for the general supervision
and guarantee of another person's performance of a contract that includes the economic
development of resources located in Burma; (c) [t]he purchase of a share of ownership,
including an equity interest, in the economic development of resources located in Burma; or (d)
[t]he entry into a contract providing for the participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in the
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One focus of the sanctions is investment in the development of
"resources" in Burma. The term "resources" means natural, agricultural,
commercial, financial, industrial, and human resources. 26 Burma is blessed
with an abundance of natural resources, and the sanctions target the
economic development of these natural resources. 27 Contracts related to the
economic development of these resources include "contracts conferring
rights to explore, develop, extract, or refine petroleum, natural gas, or
minerals.., to take over a mining operation [or] ... to acquire land and run
a hotel or factory ... to acquire a forest or agricultural area and exploit the
timber or other crops,"'' 28 as well as the acquisition of land on which a
factory or hotel could be built.' 29 For example, a U.S. company is prohibited
from building factories in Burma that make use of industrial, commercial,
and human resources located in Burma.' 30
Sanctions also prohibit the supervision or guarantee of a third party's
performance of a contract that includes the economic development of
resources in Burma. 13 1  For example, sanctions would prohibit a U.S.
company from acting as a general contractor for a foreign oil company for a
economic development of resources located in Burma, without regard to the form of the
participation.
31 C.F.R. § 537.308.
Finch et al. suggest that U.S. persons could contract with individuals in Burma to develop resources
since the sanctions technically only cover contracts with the government of Burma and non-governmental
entities. Finch et al., supra note 108, at 332.
125 31 C.F.R. § 537.301.
126 Id. § 537.403.
127 See Finch et al., supra note 108, at 328.
12' 31 C.F.R. § 537.403.
129 Id.
130 See BSR, supra note 114.
131 The text of 31 C.F.R. § 537.406 reads as follows:
Section 537.201 prohibits the entry by a U.S. person into a contract providing for the general
supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of a contract that includes the
economic development of resources located in Burma, if the U.S. person's contract is entered
into on or after the effective date, unless undertaken pursuant to, or in the exercise of rights
under, a pre-effective date agreement. For the purposes of § 537.201, only the entry into
contracts for supervision and guarantee at the top level of project management, such as entry into
a contract with a development project's sponsor or owner to become a prime contractor or
general manager for a development project, will be considered new investment in Burma. By
contrast, subcontracts to provide goods, services, or technology to a prime contractor or general
manager of a development project are exempt from the prohibitions of this part pursuant to
§ 537.204 unless: (a) the functional scope of the subcontractor's obligations is substantially
similar to that of a prime contractor's or general manager's obligations; or (b) the consideration
for such subcontracts includes a share of ownership in, or participation in the royalties, earnings
or profits of, the economic development of resources located in Burma.
31 C.F.R. § 537.406.
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project to develop resources in Burma.' 32 Furthermore, a U.S. company may
not provide ongoing technical support to a foreign-owned factory in Burma
where the U.S. company is paid a percentage of generated profits.
33
However, for purposes of the regulations, only entering into contracts at the
top level of management for a development project is considered new
investment in Burma' 34  Subcontracts to provide goods, services, or
technology are exempt under the regulations unless the subcontractor
functions as a general manager or the project involves participation in the
earnings or profits from the development of economic resources in
Burma. "'35
In addition, a U.S. person may not make investments in forein
companies involved in economic development projects in Burma. 36
Although a U.S. person who has already invested in a presently prohibited
activity is not required to relinquish its shares,' 37 new shares may not be
acquired. 138 Divestment of such shares, such as contracting to sell a U.S.
person's equity or income interest in a development project in Burma to a
foreign company, is authorized under Section 537.504 of the regulations and
does not constitute a prohibited facilitation of a third-party's investment in
Burma. 139
2. Agreements Entered into Prior to May 21, 1997
The Order exempts investment agreements made prior to May 21,
1997 if the agreements meet certain conditions. 40 OFAC must approve all
U.S. investments in Burma that fall within the authority of the sanctions. 14
OFAC evaluates the clarity of the agreement, the scope and the specificity of
the activity or investment, and the legal enforceability of the terms of the
agreement to determine whether an activity may be allowed. 42 Moreover, a
132 BSR, supra note 114.
133 Id.
'34 Id.; 31 C.F.R. § 537.406.
:35 31 C.F.R. §§ 537.204, 537.406.
136 Id. § 537.409.
137 Id. § 537.405.
138 Id.
131 Id. § 537.504. The following is an example of a permitted divestment in a development project in
Burma. "A U.S. oil company holds a pre-effective date contract to develop a Burmese oil field. It wishes
to sell its rights under the contract to a foreign company. It is authorized to sell an interest without prior
authorization from OFAC, but if the agreement is valued at more than $10,000, the seller must file a report
with OFAC within 10 days of the signing of the agreement." BSR, supra note 114.
'4 31 C.F.R. § 537.407(a).
:1 BSR, supra note 114; see also 31 C.F.R. § 537.407.
142 31 C.F.R. § 537.407.
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U.S. person who is party to an agreement or investment made prior to May
21, 1997 may enter into subsequent agreements related to investments
pursuant to the pre-effective date, if such agreements were specifically
contemplated at the time the original contract was made and after the
original exempt activity has been approved by OFAC. 143 OFAC has issued
several licenses with respect to transactions in Burma since the imposition of
investment sanctions in 1997.144
3. Prohibition on Facilitating New Investment
Foreign affiliates and subsidiaries of U.S. companies are not explicitly
prohibited from investing in Burma. However, the sanctions prohibit a U.S.
person from facilitating or approving a third party's new investment in
Burma. 145 Section 537.409 of the regulations describes several prohibited
activities, including "brokering, financing, guaranteeing, or approving the
entry by any foreign person, including a foreign affiliate, into a contract for
the development of, e.g., a natural gas field, a tourist hotel complex, or a
rubber plantation in Burma.'
146
4. Commercial Exemptions
The regulations specifically state that not-for-profit and educational
investments in Burma are still permitted. 147 Moreover, a U.S. citizen or
corporation may engage in "the entry into, performance of, or financing of a
contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology" provided it is not
for the general supervision and guarantee of a third party's performance in
an economic development project in Burma, that payment is not in the form
of shares of ownership in such a project, or that the U.S. person or entity
does not participate in the earnings or profits of the development of
resources. 148 Non-equity investments are also exempt. 49  Thus, U.S.
persons may purchase debt instruments from the Burmese government or
companies in Burma as long as the instruments are not convertible into
equity and the U.S. person does not participate in royalties, earnings, or
.43 Id. §§ 537.407(b)-(c).
144 1998 President's Letter, supra note 66.
143 31 C.F.R. § 537.202.
'4 Id. § 537.409(b).
141 Id. § 537.301.
141 See id. § 537.408.
149 See id. §§ 537.204, 537.404, 537.405, 537.408.
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profits. 150  To clarify further, the following activities are permitted: (1) the
marketing of goods or services through a sales representative or sales agent,
through a U.S. person or corporate subsidiary established and operating in
Burma before May 21, 1997, or through any established foreign (including
Burmese) distributorship; 151 (2) the rental, lease, or purchase of space in
connection with the continued operation of a business in operation prior to
the effective date; 152 (3) the hiring and training of Burmese employees to
carry out exempted activities; 153 (4) entering into contracts for registration or
renewal of patents, trademarks, and copyrights; 154 and (5) financing by U.S.
banks, as long as financing instruments cannot be converted into equity and
the bank does not receive any profits from the development of the project in
Burma. 155
C. Selective Purchasing Laws
Dissatisfied with federal sanctions, a number of U.S. municipalities
and states have enacted measures modeled after South African anti-apartheid
statutes that restrict trade and commerce with Burma.' 56  For example,
"So See id. § 537.404:
The purchase of shares, including an equity interest, in the economic development of resources
located in Burma, is prohibited when those shares are purchased after the effective date directly
or indirectly from the Government of Burma or a nongovernmental entity in Burma, unless
purchased pursuant to an agreement entered into prior to May 21, 1997. U.S. persons may
purchase debt instruments issued by the Government of Burma or a nongovernmental entity in
Burma, directly or indirectly, provided that such instruments are not convertible into equity, and
do not provide for participation, including as collateral or security, in royalties, earnings, or
profits in the economic development of resources located in Burma.
See also id. § 537.405.
's' Id. § 537.408(b)(1).
52 Id. § 537. 408(b)(2).
113 Id. § 537.408(b)(3). The employment of personnel in Burma under these circumstances is
considered the purchase of employment services, which is exempt from prohibition under Section 537.204.
Id. § 537.204.
' Id. § 537.408(b)(4).
'" Id. § 537.408(b)(5).
156 See Shawna Fullerton, State Foreign Policy: The Legitimacy of the Massachusetts Burma Law, 8
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 249 (1999). However, in June 1999, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
federal law preempts the Massachusetts law. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and will hear oral
arguments in the spring of 2000. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Decide Foreign Policy Question in
Massachusetts Boycott of Burma, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at A19. See also State Attorney General
Seeks Review of Burma Trade Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 1999, at B5. In addition, the WTO, the
European Union, the National Foreign Trade Council, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have challenged
the legality of the Massachusetts law. See Steve Charnovitz, Symposium, The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets: The Globalization of Economic Human Rights,
25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 113, 123 (1999); National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289
(D. Mass. 1998). The European Union and Japan assert that the Massachusetts law violates U.S.
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Massachusetts prohibits the state from doing business with companies that
trade with Burma.' 57  Although selective purchasing laws place potential
contractors at a competitive disadvantage, these purchasing policies apply to
both U.S. and foreign companies, which creates a level playing field for all
investors. In contrast, federal investment sanctions affect only U.S.
persons.15
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE EFFICACY OF THE U.S. SANCTIONS
The impact of the current sanctions scheme has been diminished
because U.S. companies are authorized to continue existing operations and
remain free to trade with Burma. 59 Moreover, the current sanctions actually
remove the President's flexibility to respond to changes in Burma because it
is Congress that must lift sanctions, IT and nowhere is it explained how
sanctions will lead to improvements in human rights. 16  In fact, sanctions
have not inspired positive reform or development in Burma. The efficacy of
sanctions is also limited by a combination of both internal and external
factors. Burma's drug-saturated economy and ASEAN's engagement policy
have neutralized the impact of the sanctions on Burma's economy.66 Burma
has compensated for the small amount of lost U.S. investment by focusing
on its thriving drug trade and by doing business with other countries in the
region.
A. Drug-laundered Funds Sustain the Burmese Economy
Burma's prosperous drug trade sustains the Burmese economy and
explains in part why the withdrawal of U.S. investments in the late nineties
obligations under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement with respect to non-discrimination for
qualified suppliers. Asamoah et al., supra note 49, at 562. See also Robert Reno, Bay State's Tilt at
'Burma 'Shows Us Why Trade Is Hot, NEWSDAY, Dec. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8201410. "What we
feel very uncomfortable with is that we get conflicting signals about who determines U.S. foreign policy
and what the content of U.S. foreign policy is," says Bernd Langeheine, trade counselor in the European
Commission's Washington office. Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. States and Cities Increase Use of Trade
Sanctions, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1998, at 12.
157 Reno, supra note 156.
158 See supra Part III.B.I.
159 See Exec. Order No. 13,047, supra note 95.
160 Finch et al., supra note 108, at 338.
161 Id. at 325.
162 1998 President's Letter, supra note 66.
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has had only a minor impact.163 The saturation of drug-laundered funds inBurma threatens legitimate business investments and contributes to an
infrastructure already lacking the institutional mechanisms for economic
growth. 64 As U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs Robert Gelbard concludes, "The Burmese junta has
brazenly exploited drug trafficking ... [D]rug traffickers and their families
are among the leading backers of high-profile infrastructure projects in
Burma. They launder their money with impunity in banks controlled by the
military. 16 l
Burma's leaders maintain cooperative relationships with the country's
drug traffickers. In October 1999, Khin Nyunt, a top general, visited the
notorious drug lord Wei Hsueh-kang at Wei's headquarters near the Thai
border. 166 Wei Hsueh-kang is the leader of the rebel United Wa State Army
and has been given land, political amnesty, and support by the junta to stophis movement against the central govemnment.167 In return, many of his drug
profits have been reinvested in Burmese infrastructure. 68  Moreover, the
junta has rejected repeated U.S. requests for action against the notorious
opium warlord Khun Sa, who surrendered to the Burmese government in1996 but who continues to live under military protection in Rangoon. 169
The shortsightedness of the military junta ruling Burma presents a
threat to Burma's sustainable growth and development. The junta presently
has a steady inflow of illicit drug profits to fill any vacuum left by the
withdrawal of U.S. investments. However, the prevalence of drug profits
threatens economic development and sustainable growth because the drug
business discourages legitimate investment in Burma.
163 See Marisa Chimprabha & Yindee Lertcharoenchok, U.S. Blasts Burma for Allowing Drug Barons
to Live with Impunity in Rangoon, NATION (Bangkok), Mar. 5, 1999, available in LEXIS, 1999 FT Asia
Intelligence Wire.4See Rollert, supra note 4; Drug Lord Spreads Trade 'With Help of Generals', S. CHINA MORNING
POST (Nov. 17, 1999), available in Shweinc Team Homepage <http://www.shweinc.com/news/data/
991117130933. shtml>.
165 Rollert, supra note 4.
16 Bangkok Post Editorial: Burma's Dangerous Message on Drugs, BANGKOK POST (Nov. 7, 1999),
available in Free Burma Coalition Website: News <http://www.freebufmacoalition.org/1999/11/07/
drugsinburmaeditorial.html> [hereinafter Burma "s Dangerous Message on Drugs].
167 Id.
168 See Rollert, supra note 4; Freedom House 1998 Ratings, supra note 2.
169 Chimprabha & Lertcharoenchok, supra note 163.
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B. Minimal U.S. Investment
The impact of U.S. sanctions in Burma has also been limited because
there was never much U.S. investment in Burma to begin with. In 1997,
U.S. investment represented less than ten percent of foreign investment in
Burma. 70 OFAC only had to notify fifty firms with operations in or ties to
Burma of the implications and prohibition of new investment under
Executive Order 13,047.171 U.S. investments in Burma totaled only $30.2
million in 1995/1996. 17 In contrast, in 1998/1999 the United Kingdom and
Singapore invested $96.4 million and $87.9 million, respectively, in
Burma. 173 In 1997/1998, Singapore's foreign direct investment in Burma
totaled $307.5 million. 174
Although the U.S. sanctions do not specifically target trade between
Burma and the United States (as opposed to investment in Burma), trade
between the two countries is relatively small. In November 1999, year-to-
date trade between the United States and Burma amounted to $7.61 million
in exports (mainly machinery and transport equipment) and $158.43 million
in imports (mainly manufactured articles). 75 During this same period, the
total trade volumes between the United States and its major trading partners
were as follows: Canada, $298.42 billion; Japan, $154.89 billion; China,
$78.57 billion; and Taiwan, $44.33 billion. 176
While the decrease of foreign direct investment in Burma may
indicate that U.S. sanctions are negatively affecting the Burmese economy,
economic mismanagement and the Asian financial crisis are more likely the
reasons for the downturn. 177  In fact, even before the imposition of
investment sanctions in 1997, U.S. investment in Burma was decreasing.'
78
A number of U.S. companies, including Pepsi Co., Levi Strauss, Motorola,
Hewlett Packard, 179 Amoco, Liz Claiborne, Macy's, Eddie Bauer, Columbia
170 Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 68, at 187.
171 1998 President's Letter, supra note 66.
172 1999 IMF Report, supra note 26, at 78.
73 Id.
174 Id.
175 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Trade with Burma (Myanmar) in 1999 (visited Nov. 19, 1999)
<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/sftcr/1999/c5460.html>.
176 U.S. Census Bureau, Top Ten Countries with Which the US. Trades (visited Jan. 14, 2000)
<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/1999/10/balance.html>.
'7 See U.S. Sanctions Hurt Myanmar, OIL DAILY, Aug. 9, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10013668;
see also 1998 President's Letter, supra note 66.
178 See 1999 IMF Report, supra note 26, at 78.
179 Myanmar 1998 Review, supra note 39.
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Sportswear, Oshkosh B'Gosh, and Apple Computer, withdrew from Burma
even before sanctions were imposed.1
0
C. The Substitution Effect
The engagement policy of member states of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations effectively counteracts the policy of isolating
Burma that the United States promotes with its current sanctions scheme.'
81
The ASEAN member states that continue to invest in Burma fill any void
left by the withdrawal of U.S. investment. 82 When Texaco sold its 42.9%
stake in the Burmese Yetagun oil and gas field in late 1997, Petronas of
Malaysia purchased 36.4%. 183 When Dutch beer brewer Heineken pulled
out of Burma, Fraser and Neave of Singapore bought its stake in the half-
completed brewery there.' 84  Moreover, in November 1998, the Canadian
company Indochina Goldfields announced the opening of a $300 million
copper mine in Burma.18 5 Another Canadian company, Mindoro Resources,
has partnered with the Burmese junta in a gold exploration project.18 6
Furthermore, the withdrawal of most U.S. interests in Burma
strengthened the historically close relations between China and Burma.' 87
One week after the U.S. announced its sanctions in 1997, the Chinese signed
180 143 CONG. REc. S3464 (1997).
181 Formed in 1967 to foster regional trade, growth, peace, and prosperity, ASEAN counts as member
states all of the countries of Southeast Asia (Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) except Cambodia, which was denied entry in 1997 due to political
instability and human rights concerns. (This is ironic since ASEAN has not yet showed concern over the
Burmese junta's human rights record and turned a blind eye to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in
1975). Thio, supra note 10, at 13. Despite fervent lobbying by both the United States and the European
Union, Burma became a member of ASEAN in 1997. The United States and the European Union argued
that ASEAN membership would impose legitimacy on an illegitimate, repressive regime. Id. at 48.
Although Thailand and the Philippines suggested that Burma should democratize before entry into ASEAN
in 1997, the prevailing view was that the Burmese junta would improve its human rights record after entry.
No demands were made on the military dictatorship to liberalize or improve its human rights record prior to
entry into ASEAN. Id. at 40. In contrast, European Union membership is contingent on observance of
treaty-based human rights norms. Frank J. Garcia, Symposium, The Global Market and Human Rights:
Trading away the Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK J. INT'L L. 51, 61 (1999). Moreover, ASEAN
member states maintain that the economic, social, and cultural realities of each country are unique and that
the human rights situations of a country should be evaluated with these realities in mind. Thio, supra note
10, at 1-2.
182 See Siazon Criticizes U.S. Policy on Burma: Economic Sanctions Won't Work Philippine Foreign
Minister Says, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJA 11012874.
:83 Myanmar 1998 Review, supra note 39.
84 Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 68, at 204.
': Craig Forcese, The Great Trade-off, THIs MAG., Feb. 1999, at 24-25.
1 Id.
187 Myanmar 1998 Review, supra note 39.
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a new economic and trade agreement with Burma.188 Between 1992 and
1994, the two countries signed a $1.2 billion arms deal, and China supplied
arms worth $300 million out of the total $370 million that Burma spent on
arms imports. 189 China has also supplied Burma with technical staff and
communications equipment to monitor naval developments in the Indian
Ocean, 90 and Burmese military officers are regularly trained in Yunnan
Province in southwest China.'
91
The engagement policy of Burma's neighbors and the facility with
which the junta has substituted any lost U.S. investment with drug-laundered
profits have neutralized the impact of U.S. investment sanctions. The
United States did fulfill its moral obligation as the defacto world policeman
when it imposed sanctions on Burma. Lawmakers, human rights activists,
corporate lobbyists, and consumers would probably all agree that the human
rights abuses by the Burmese junta justify some form of punitive action.
However, both internal and external factors limit the efficacy of the current
sanctions.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the reprehensible conduct of the Burmese military junta
justifies sanctions on moral grounds, the U.S. sanctions have not had their
intended result. 92 The suffering of the Burmese people continues.
Therefore, the United States should consider revoking investment sanctions
and returning to a policy of constructive engagement.' 93 Additionally, the
United States should employ a multifaceted approach by advocating and
assisting with international mediation between Burma's military junta, the
NLD and ethnic minorities, and facilitating the establishment of a national
human rights commission in Burma to train and educate military personnel
and corporate employees. Alternatively, if the United States decides that
sanctions are the best method for encouraging positive change, it should
promote the role of multilateral organizations such as the WTO or ASEAN
in the enforcement of human rights in Burma. The WTO could enforce
multilateral sanctions against countries with especially egregious human
rights records. In addition, the United States should promote the ASEAN
188 Id.
189 Alamgir, supra note 18, at 346.
90 Myanmar 1998 Review, supra note 39.
191 Id.
192 See supra Parts II, IV.
93 Richard N. Haass, Conclusion to ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note
6, at 198.
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initiative for establishment of a human rights body in Southeast Asia to
monitor regional human rights violations. ASEAN needs to assume a
position of leadership to ensure realization of its mission to advance the
prosperity, health, and safety of the region's citizens.
A. Return to Engagement
Although the severity of human rights violations engaged in by the
Burmese junta and the insufficiency of counter-narcotics actions in Burma
may morally justify the imposition of sanctions, the United States should
consider revoking its investment prohibition due to its limited practical
effect. 194 It is easy for the United States to assume the role of the world's
policeman and continue sanctions as a symbol of its official displeasure with
the Burmese junta's rule. However, the continued suffering of the Burmese
people at the hands of the military junta does not support the policy of
isolation the United States currently endorses. The problems outlined above,
which reduce the efficacy of investment sanctions, suggest that constructive
engagement may present a better option for lasting reform and sustainable
self-help and growth in Burma.
Economic engagement and growth expands the middle-class,
increases contact with the outside world, and loosens the government's grip
on power,195 thus creating pressure to reform.' 96  Democratization is very
difficult to manipulate from the outside,' 97 and the success of sanctions such
194 See generally Finch, supra note 4; Finch et al., supra note 108. U.S. Secretary of State Madeline
Albright answered a question on whether it was hypocritical to impose tougher sanctions on Burma than on
China by saying "[w]e have to have a flexible approach to how we deal with it, depending upon what our
national interests are, and we have to understand where we have strategic relationships that require us to
take a different approach." Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement on U.S. Sanctions Against
Burma, available in U.S. Dep't of State Homepage (Apr. 22, 1997) <http://secretary.state.gov/www/
statements/970422.html>. The reasons for inflicting a punitive sanction scheme on Burma and not China
probably include the fact that Burma is of little geopolitical or economic importance versus the economic
and military muscle China asserts. Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, The Corporate Accountability
Movement: Lessons & Opportunities, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 151, 164 (1999).
195 Mark A. Warner, Globalization and Human Rights: An Economic Model, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
99, 108, 110 Z1999).
196 See id.; see also Clinton Defends 'Constructive Engagement' of China, available in CNN.com
Homepage (Oct. 24, 1997) <http://europe.enn.com/ALLPOLMTCS/1997/10/24/clinton.china/>; Catharin
Dalpino, China Eases Gingerly into an Era of Cautious Openness: Human Rights Improving Slowly, available
in CNN.com Homepage (Oct. 23, 1999) <http://nn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/red.giant/
human.rights.dalpino/> (discussing the economic reforms and environment of"soft authoritarianism" that has
resulted in noticeable improvement of human rights in China).
197 Rose Gideon, Haiti, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 6, at 57,
72.
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as the ban on new investment in Burma is questionable. 198 Richard Haass,
Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brooking Institution, states,
"depending on how they are used, they [sanctions] can cause great damage
to innocent men, women and children."'199 Indeed, sanctions "reduc[e] the
scope for independent action" and "can work against forces promoting
political pluralism" by creating scarcity and enabling the autocratic
government to better control distribution of goods.2 °° Contributing to the
very isolation Burma voluntarily engaged in for so long simply perpetuates
its poverty and underdevelopment. In isolation, the repressive military
generals in Burma have nobody to answer to but themselves.
B. International Diplomacy
The United States should encourage the regime to enter a "meaningful
dialogue" with the democratic opposition, the NLD, and ethnic minority
groups with the assistance of an international mediator. All parties in Burma
could benefit from the neutrality of international involvement as each has
accused the other of intransigence in negotiations.20' A promising
development in relations between Burma and the United States was the one-
day February 2000 visit to Burma by Ralph Boyce, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.20 2 This was the
highest-level visit by a U.S. government representative in five years, and
Boyce met with the NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the SPDC's deputy
foreign minister Khin Maung Win, and foreign aid workers.20 3
The United States should also encourage its allies to enter into
dialogue with Burma. The European Union sent a diplomatic mission to
Burma in July 1999.204 In addition, Japan's Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi
met with Burmese General Than Shwe in November 1999, ending a fifteen-
year period in which there was no high-level political contact between the
two countries. 205 Japan had historically been Burma's largest bilateral aiddonor, but aid was suspended in 1988 after the bloody military crackdown
198 Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime,
75 CALIF. L. REv. 1159, 1174 (1987).
199 Haass, supra note 6, at 206.
200 Id. at 203.
201 See Finch, supra note 4, at 14.
202 US. Official Visits Myanmar, AP ONLINE, Feb. 18, 2000, available in 2000 WL 1432170.
203 Id.
204 EU Suggests Fact-Finding Mission to Myanmar, Reuters, available in University of Adelaide
Student Webpage (June 30, 1999) <http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/-uneoo/a 120/99.htm>.
205 Jendrzejczyk, supra note 25.
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on pro-democracy supporters.2 °6 Japanese leaders have indicated that aid
could resume if Burma demonstrates "visible" signs of political and
economic reform.2 °7
There are signs that Burma's leaders are opening up to international
demands for liberalization and reform. While in 1998 the junta rejected a
billion-dollar offer of aid from the World Bank and the United Nations that
was conditioned on political reform,20 8 after the World Bank published a
scathing report condemning the regime and calling for political and
economic reform in the fall of 1999, the junta reopened dialogue with the
World Bank.20 9 Moreover, after the junta concluded its talks with Japan, it
began to reopen the universities that had been open for only thirty months
between 1988 and 1996.210 This is a step in the right direction. Lifting
restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly, releasing all political
prisoners, and taking effective action to end the use of forced labor should
211be next on the junta's agenda.
C. Establishment of a National Human Rights Commission in Burma
The United States should support the establishment of a national
human rights commission ("HRC") in Burma. The junta and the NLD
should negotiate the principles and framework for the national HRC.
212
Both the Philippines and Indonesia have set up national HRCs in the last
decade. The 1997 Thai Constitution requires the establishment of an HRC
in Thailand, and Malaysia is currently considering the establishment of a
similar body.213 In addition, ASEAN established a working group for an
206 id.
207 Id.
208 Thomas Crampton, Policy Shift in Rangoon After WE Warning, DAWN, available in ShweInc
NEWs (Nov. 17, 1999) <wysiwyg://49/http://www.shweinc.com/news/data/991117130823.shtml>.
209 Myanmar Invites World Bank for Talk, Assoc. Press News Wire, available in Shwelnc NEWs
(Nov. 15, 1999) <wysiwyg://52/http://www.shweinc.com/news/data/99111512041 l.shtml> [hereinafter
Myanmar Invites World Bank for Talks]; Burma's Dangerous Message on Drugs, supra note 166. The
World Bank has no plans to resume a lending relationship with Burma at this time. World Bank to
Continue Talks with Myanmar, but Rules out Loans, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 15, 2000, available in
2000 WL 2733527.
210 Foreign Affairs Comm., All Burma Fed'n of Student Unions, Statement Upon the Long-term
Closure of Universities and Colleges in Burma, available in Free Burma Coalition Homepage (Nov. 25,
1999) <http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/1999/11/2 1/universityclosures.html>.
211 See Jendrzejczyk, supra note 25.
212 See, e.g., Finch, supra note 4, at 14.
2 3 Thio, supra note 10, at 2; Malaysianlaw.com, Human Rights Commission to Be Established
(visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.geocities.com/-malaysianlaw/news061299.html>.
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ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism in 1996, and member states are taking
214an internal, proactive approach to improving the welfare of its citizens.
1. Main Functions and Necessary Conditions
A national HRC can have a positive effect even in a country such as
Burma, which is ruled by an authoritarian regime. David Steinberg, Director
of Asian Studies at Georgetown University, noted that under President
Suharto in Indonesia, the Indonesian Human Rights Commission played a
positive role even under an authoritarian administration.21 5 In post-Suharto
Indonesia, the Indonesian Human Rights Commission continues to uncover
a large number of human rights violations that took place during Suharto's
thirty-two year rule.216
A Burmese HRC would work to distribute information to the general
public about human rights norms, provide training and curricula for both
military personnel and corporate employees on standards of conduct that
would promote human rights, hear grievances, and monitor compliance with
human rights norms by the military, corporations, and nongovernmental
organizations ("NGOs").217 The four main functions of the Indonesian
Human Rights Commission offer a framework for an HRC in Burma. These
four functions are (1) to inform national communities about the national and
international norms of human rights; (2) to monitor international human
rights treaties and make ratification recommendations; (3) to make
suggestions to government agencies on human rights protection
mechanisms; and (4) to cooperate with regional and international
agencies.
2 18
According to Li-ann Thio, law professor at the National University of
Singapore, several elements are required for an HRC to function effectively:
(1) legal, operational, and financial autonomy; and (2) independent
procedures governing the composition, appointment, and dismissal of
members.219 Because Burma lacks a system of checks and balances between
220society and the militarist state, international mediators should initially
214 Thio, supra note 10, at 5; see infra Part V.D.2.
2 5 David I. Steinberg, Cautious Diplomacy May Help Burma, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1999,
available in 1999 WL-WSJA 20529242.
216 Thio, supra note 10, at 66.
217 See generally Thio, supra note 10; Steinberg, supra note 215.
218 Thio, supra note 10, at 64.
219 Id. at 62.
220 See generally id.
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monitor the set-up and operation of the HRC. Cooperation and consultation
between the various national HRCs should also be encouraged.22'
2. Corporate Involvement
While numerous firms have left Burma due to consumer and
government pressure, firms such as Best Western Hotels, Unocal,
InterDigital, Total, Sony, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi, Premier Oil, and LaSalle Bank
continue to operate in Burma.222 The HRC could train and monitor
corporate employees and managers in a corporate code and thereby enlist the
help of businesses in improving human rights in Burma.223
The HRC could establish a code of corporate conduct for foreign
companies operating in Burma along the lines of the Sullivan Principles
employed in South Africa when that country was under apartheid rule.224
Buttressing the Sullivan Principles is the idea that economic growth should
be used to positively improve a country's human rights record. The Sullivan
Principles were a voluntary code of conduct for foreign companies in South
Africa developed as an alternative to complete divestiture.225 These general
principles were directed at "breaking down the barriers of apartheid and
[e]ngaging all sides to the conflict," while also embracin the notion that a
constructive American presence imparts American values.
Rangoon-based attorney James Finch has proposed a number of
components for a corporate code of conduct in Burma. These include (1) a
prohibition against forced labor and child labor; (2) a prohibition on dealing
with partners or contractors suspected of operating with laundered drug
funds; (3) a commitment to affirmative action policies; (4) a commitment to
221 Id. at 78.
222 See Burma and the Investors in Terror, available in Burma.net (visited Dec. 9, 1999)
<http://www.geocities.con/Capitol Hill/3108/>; Free Burma Coalition, Best Western: Clean Rooms, Dirty
Conscience (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/campaigns/bestwestem/
bestwestem.html>.
223 See generally Finch, supra note 4; Morton Winston, Human Rights: Corporate Morals in the
Globalocal Theater (Enlisting Corporate Assistance in the Fight for International Human Rights), WHOLE
EARTH, June 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL 16634513.
224 See Finch, supra note 4, at 14.
225 Created by Leon Sullivan, an African-American minister in Philadelphia who was on the board of
General Motors, the Sullivan Principles were negotiated between companies and the nonprofit
organizations that were pressuring them to pull out of South Africa. Id. at 14, 15 n.8.226 See id. at 14. Similarly, the MacBride principles mandate non-discrimination against Catholics
and were developed for U.S. corporations operating in Northern Ireland. The principles were introduced by
Sean MacBride, former U.N. Commissioner to Namibia, Nobel Peace Prize winner, and co-founder of
Amnesty International. Craig Forcese, Municipal Buying Power and Human Rights in Burma: The Case
for Canadian Municipal 'Selective Purchasing' Policies, 56 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 251, 256 n.21
(1998).
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engage in environmentally responsible conduct; (5) a requirement that
representatives of companies meet with representatives of both the SPDC
and the NLD to discuss progress and compliance; and (6) a requirement that
a percentage of profits generated by the corporation go to support local
NGOs such as the Burma Red Cross and AIDS prevention programs.227
3. Current Efforts to Establish an HRC in Burma
The junta has discussed the possibility of establishing an HRC in
Burma. In August 1999, Australian Human Rights Commissioner Chris
Sidoti spent three days in Rangoon discussing the establishment of an HRC
in Burma similar to those that exist in Indonesia and the Philippines. 228 The
proposed HRC discussed would work in cooperation with the Asia-Pacific
Forum of National Human Rights Institutes, an organization established by
delegates from HRCs in India, Indonesia, New Zealand, and other
countries. 229 NLD leaders opposed the talks, warning that such discussions
could be viewed by the Burmese government as a "tacit approval of what
they are doing to the democratic forces of Burma." 230 In response Sidoti
said, "I know that Daw Aung Sun Suu Kyi and the NLD and others who
support the development of democracy in Burma might not like this, but the
NLD is not in power in Burma. It is not in a position to do anything to
improve the human rights of the people of Burma." 231 Thus, based on the
model proposed and the experience of other East Asian countries, the United
States should support efforts to establish an HRC in Burma.
D. The Contribution of Multilateral Organizations to the Enforcement of
Human Rights
The growing importance of multilateral organizations such as the
WTO and ASEAN makes these organizations potentially ke% players in the
promotion of human rights in Burma and other countries. 23  If the United
States decides against a policy of constructive engagement and in favor of
227 Finch, supra note 4, at 14.
228 Steinberg, supra note 215; Bob Burton, Australia-Burma: After Timor, Time to 'Talk Tough' on
Rangoon, Inter Press Service, Sept. 29, 1999.
229 Thio, supra note 10, at 60.230 Burton, supra note 228.
231 Id. One wonders whether Sidoti's words are somewhat overstated. Yet, the importance of an
HRC in Burma as a first step towards monitoring human rights compliance and improving the daily
suffering endured by the Burmese should not be underestimated.232 See Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions As an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human
Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, II AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1996).
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maintaining sanctions on Burma, it should encourage human rights
monitoring and enforcement by these multilateral organizations.233 Burma is
a member of both the WTO and ASEAN and is therefore subject to the
jurisdiction of both organizations.234 Whereas the unilateral sanctions
scheme imposed by the United States has been ineffective, a multilateral
sanctions scheme could prove successful because it would eliminate the
problem of the substitution effect.235
1. WTO
A multinational trade organization such as the WTO could play a
constructive role in the multilateral enforcement of human rights in
Burma.236 The WTO was formed on January 1, 1995, as the "legal and
institutional foundation of the multilateral trading system" and is intended to
provide a framework for international trade agreements and a platform for
collective debate and negotiations on trade relations.
237
The WTO should establish a human rights monitoring body with
investigative, judicial, and decision-making powers.2 38 A standardized
system of trade sanctions for the enforcement of human rights is compatible
with the WTO regime. Article XX(e) allows a member of the WTO to
prohibit the import of another member's goods if the other member uses
prison labor to produce those goods. 239 The WTO thus presently permits
one member to use trade sanctions to protect the basic human rights of
citizens of other member states.240
Pressure is growing within the WTO for the establishment of
mechanisms designed to maintain and promote basic human rights
233 Id.
234 Members of the World Trade Organization (visited Apr. 12, 2000) <http://www.fwkc.com/
encyclopedia/low/articles/w/w028001118f.html>; Thio, supra note 10, at 13 and accompanying text.235 Id. at 32. Stirling states, "Burma is also an example of the less than successful attempts of the
United States to act independently as the world's arbiter of human rights." Id. at 31.
236 Id.; see Garcia, supra note 181, at 87; see generally Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in
Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689 (1998) (further discussing the linkages between morality and
international trade policy).
237 Elisabeth Cappuyns, Linking Labor Standards and Trade Sanctions: An Analysis of Their Current
Relationship, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 659, 673 (1998).
238 Stirling, supra note 232, at 40-42. See World Trade Org., WTO Dispute Settlement (visited Mar.
21, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/dispute.htm> for an in-depth description of WTO dispute
settlement rules and procedures.
239 Stirling, supra note 232, at 38. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A- 11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
240 Stirling, supra note 232, at 38.
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standards. While developing countries such as Burma argue that the WTO
should not deviate from its primary function of eliminating trade barriers,
the argument that the WTO should address human rights, labor, and
environmental issues in the context of its efforts to promote trade is gaining
worldwide support. 24  At the Quadrilateral Meeting between the United
States, Europe, Canada, and Japan following the completion of the 1994
Uruguay Round of negotiations, representatives of the four nations discussed
the subject of a "social clause" in future rounds. 242 Further, at the December
1999 WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, President Clinton suggested that
his administration is open to the possibility of using the WTO to advance
international human rights when he said, "ultimately I would favor a system
in which sanctions would come for violating any provision of a trade
agreement. ' 243  Assuming that Clinton means that every trade agreement
under the WTO should include provisions protecting the human rights of
workers and citizens of the member countries, he is supporting the role of
multilateral sanctions in the international enforcement of human rights.244
2. ASEAN
The United States should support an ASEAN initiative to establish a
regional enforcement mechanism for human rights that could address human
rights violations in Burma. Though infamous for its noninterventionist
policy and antipathy towards the human rights records of its member states,
ASEAN has been inspired by the development of HRCs in Indonesia and the
Philippines and, since the early nineties, has renewed efforts to establish a
regional enforcement mechanism for human rights.245  Thus, the
establishment of a regional protective mechanism for human rights within
ASEAN may be just around the corner.246
241 See generally id.
242 Id. at 36.
243 Guy De Jonquieres, Clinton Demands Threaten Turmoil at WTO Summit: President Outlines
Long-Term Goal ofLink Between Trade and Labour Standards, FTN. TIMES (London), Dec. 2, 1999.244 Stirling, supra note 232, at 3. Stirling argues that trade sanctions are the most effective
mechanism for the international enforcement of human rights. Id.
245 Thio, supra note 10, at 7; see also ASEAN Chairman Sees Positive Human Rights Trend in
Region, Dow Jones Int'l News Serv., July 28, 1999, available in LEXIS, Djins. Further, all ASEAN
countries are parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and all member states, except Brunei, are
parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Dr. Vitit
Muntarbhom, Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, Towards an ASEAN Human
Rights Mechanism (visited Feb. 25, 2000) <http://www.rwgmechanism.com/humanrights/html>
[hereinafter ASEAN Human Rights Concept Paper].
246 See generally Thio, supra note 10. Other human rights activities in 1998 and 1999 within ASEAN
included the workshop on the Advocacy of Human Rights to Establish Democracy as Part of the
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Because ASEAN serves as a forum of intra-regional cooperation, a
human rights mechanism is entirely within its scope. 24  Although originally
established to promote economic development, peace, and prosperity in
Southeast Asia, ASEAN has extended its cooperative activities to include
248human development. In fact, Principle III of the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord from 1976 states that a primary concern of ASEAN is "the
elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy . . . [with] particular
emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the
living standards of their peoples., 249 The 1992 Singapore Declaration issued
at the Fourth ASEAN Summit highlights cooperative activities in the realms
of environmental protection, sustainable development, control of HIV, and
measures against drug trafficking. ° Furthermore, the ASEAN Vision 2020,
adopted by ASEAN heads of government in 1997, states that ASEAN
envisions a region free from hunger, poverty, malnutrition, and illicit drug
production, trafficking, and use, and where "social justice and the rule of law
reign.
'
,
2 5 1
The initiative for a regional human rights mechanism in ASEAN dates
back to the early nineties. 2 In 1993, ASEAN foreign ministers reaffirmed
their commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World
Conference of Human Rights, and agreed that ASEAN should consider the
Reformation Agenda in Indonesia; national and state level seminars on the role of NGOs and human rights
in Malaysia; the Philippine Declaration of Human Rights and a Philippine national campaign for an
ASEAN human rights mechanism; workshops and research on HRCs; and a national conference and
workshop on human rights education in Thailand. Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights
Mechanism, National Activities for 1998-1999 (visited Feb. 25, 2000) <http://www.rwgmechansim.com
national.html>. Regional activities in 1998 and 1999 included the workshop on national human rights
institutions in Asia and a regional conference on complying with the standards of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, Chronology ofActivities
(visited Feb. 25, 2000) <http://www.rwgmechanism.com/chronology.html> [hereinafter Chronology of
Working Group Activities]. Note that Europe, Africa, and the Americas already have regional protective
mechanisms for human rights. These institutions range from commissions that can receive complaints from
states and individuals to regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights. ASEAN Human
Rights Concept Paper, supra note 245.
247 See Thio, supra note 10, at 78.
248 Working Group for ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, ASEAN Vision 2020 (visited Feb. 25,
2000) <http://www.rwgmechansim.com/vision.html> [hereinafter ASEAN Vision 2020].
249 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Feb. 24, 1976)
<http://www.aseansec.org/summit/concord/htm>.
250 Thio, supra note 10, at 11.
251 Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, ASEAN Vision 2020: A Community of
Carinq Societies (visited Feb. 25, 2000) <http://www.rwgmechanism.com/community.html>.
232 See Working Group for An ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, Synopsis of a Policy Initiative for
the Establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Apr. 17, 1998) <http://
www.rwgmechanism.com/synopsis.html> [hereinafter Human Rights Mechanism Synopsis].
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establishment of a regional human rights mechanism. 253 Stressing the point
that a regional human rights mechanism would permit human rights
compliance and monitoring from the standpoint of ASEAN, a working group
composed of both governmental and non-governmental members was
established after a series of workshops and meetings.254  In addition to
advocating the establishment of a regional mechanism, the working group
also promotes the establishment of a national HRC in every country of
ASEAN.255
While the specifics of the future regional human rights mechanism in
Southeast Asia have yet to be devised, all member states and non-state
actors, such as international NGOs, should participate. Rights protected by
the human rights body should include those core human rights articulated in
the UDHR, such as the right to life, liberty and the security of one's person;
the right to freedom from slavery or servitude; the right to freedom from
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; and the right to equality
before the law.256 While the establishment of a supra-national court system
that hears human rights complaints seems unlikely considering the loose
organizational structure of ASEAN, a commission that hears grievances
from both state and non-state actors and has the power to issue non-binding
recommendations is surely possible.
VI. CONCLUSION
An autocratic military junta noted for its systematic abuses of human
rights, thriving drug trade, and violent suppression of the democratically
elected opposition rules Burma with an iron fist.257 The Burmese economy
is a casualty of the military rule, and sustained human and economic
development in Burma will be an elusive aspiration unless significant
political and economic liberalization occurs. Naturally, the anguish and
suffering endured by the Burmese people, who live in a world of "silent
emergency," demanded action. As the defacto world policeman, the United
253 Specifically, the Bangkok Declaration from the Asia Intergovernmental Meeting, March 29-April
2, 1993, emphasized the region's "need to explore the possibilities of establishing regional arrangements
for the promotion and protection of human rights in Asia." Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights
Mechanism, Asia Intergov'tal Meeting-Bangkok Declaration (visited Feb. 25, 2000) <http://www.
rwgmechanism/com/asia.html> [hereinafter Asia Intergov'tal Meeting]; see also Human Rights Mechanism
Synopsis, supra note 252.
54 Chronology of Working Group Activities, supra note 246; Human Rights Mechanism Synopsis,
supra note 252.
235 Asia Intergov'tal Meeting, supra note 253; see also supra Part V.C.
236 Garcia, supra note 182, at 51-52.
257 See 1998 Burma Human Rights Practices, supra note 2; Rollert, supra note 4.
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U.S. SANCTIONS ON BURMA
States responded by imposing investment sanctions on Burma in 1997. The
purposes of the sanctions were to coerce change and end the Burmese
military junta's brutal reign.
Yet critics on both sides have labeled the current Burmese sanctions
scheme counterproductive and inefficient. 258 Factors such as the quasi-
legitimacy of drug-laundered funds, the paucity of U.S. investment in
Burma, and the substitution effect of substituting lost investment and trade
limit the efficacy of the current sanctions. As a result, the U.S. sanctions
have had little impact on the military junta ruling Burma, a force that shows
no sign of loosening its iron grip on the country.
The current sanctions scheme is not working. As such, the United
States should change its focus in dealing with Burma. First, the United
States should consider a return to engagement. Second, the United States
should promote dialogue between the NLD, ethnic minorities in Burma, and
the military junta with the assistance of an intemational mediator. Third, the
U.S. should promote the establishment of a national HRC in Burma that
monitors national compliance with international human rights norms and
trains corporate employees and relief workers to espouse human rights
norms. Alternately, the United States should work through the WTO to
promote a multilateral sanctions scheme. The WTO is in a good position to
assume leadership of the multilateral enforcement of human rights with a
sanctions regime for especially egregious human rights violators. Finally,
the United States should encourage ASEAN to assume responsibility for
human rights compliance and enforcement in Southeast Asia. It is the
member states of the regional organization ASEAN that are in the best
economic and geopolitical position to alter Burma's increasing backwards
slide into devastating poverty and end the human suffering the Burmese
people live through daily.
258 Dhooge, supra note 17, at 25; see generally Finch et al., supra note 108.
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